Structural problems for reductionism by Leuenberger, Stephan
Structural problems for reductionism
Stephan Leuenberger1
 The Author(s) 2019
Abstract Universal reductionism—the sort of project pursued by Carnap in the
Aufbau, Lewis in his campaign on behalf of Humean supervenience, Jackson in
From Metaphysics to Ethics, and Chalmers in Constructing the World—aims to
reduce everything to some specified base, more or less austere as it may be. In this
paper, I identify two constraints that a promising strategy to argue for universal
reductionism needs to satisfy: the exhaustion constraint and the chaining constraint.
As a case study, I then consider Chalmers’ Constructing the World, in which a priori
implication, or ‘‘scrutability’’, plays the role of reduction. Chalmers first divides up
the total vocabulary of our language into different families, and then argues, for
each family separately, that truths involving expressions in that family are
scrutable from the putative base. He does not systematically address the question
whether ‘‘cross-family sentences’’—sentences involving expressions from more
than one family—are scrutable. I shall argue that this lacuna cannot be filled, since
scrutability does not allow for the exhaustion constraint and the chaining constraint
to be jointly satisfied. I further suggest that Carnap’s account, in which definability
plays the role of reduction, has better prospects of meeting these constraints.
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1 Layer-cake reductionism
To reduce everything to an austere base is a familiar philosophical ambition. Such
universal reductionism comes in a variety of versions. The desired austerity in the
base may be ontological, in the sense of involving few entities or categories of
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entities; conceptual, in the sense of requiring few concepts or families of concepts;
or epistemic, in the sense of assuming only modest knowledge claims. I consider the
views advocated in Carnap (1928a), Lewis (1986), Jackson (1998), Chalmers
(2012), and Chalmers and Jackson (2001) as paradigmatic representatives of
universal reductionism.1
Despite their differences, reductionist projects tend to share a certain picture of
the world as layered, with the putative base forming the bottom layer. Every non-
basic layer is supposed to be reducible to the ones below it. Moreover, it is a guiding
assumption of reductionist picture-thinking that reduction admits of a certain kind of
‘‘chaining’’: layers higher up do not just count as reducible to the ones below them,
taken together, but also to the bottom layer all by itself.
To illustrate: if the biological reduces to the chemical and the physical together,
and the chemical reduces to the physical, then it follows that the biological reduces
to the physical alone. Or to vary and expand the example, consider the question
whether the realm of colours—the ‘‘chromatic’’—reduces to the physical. A natural
strategy in arguing for a positive answer will appeal to the phenomenal in an
auxiliary role. It is plausible that the realm of colours reduces to the physical and the
phenomenal together. Here, the physical includes properties or facts involving light,
surfaces, retinas, brains, etc, while the phenomenal includes colour qualia or facts
about what it is like to have colour experiences. It is, of course, controversial
whether the phenomenal reduces to the physical. But we would expect that in
tandem, the two reductive claims will settle our question. That is, we would expect
the argument with premises (1) and (2) and conclusion (3) to be valid:
(1) The chromatic reduces to the phenomenal and the physical together.
(2) The phenomenal reduces to the physical.
(3) The chromatic reduces to the physical.
What is more, we would expect that argument to be valid purely in virtue of the
logic of reduction, and thus remain valid no matter what we substitute for ‘‘the
chromatic’’, ‘‘the physical’’, and ‘‘the phenomenal.’’
In addition to such ‘‘vertical chaining’’ in the layer-cake, reduction should also
allow for what we might call ‘‘horizontal accumulation’’, which is exemplified by
the following argument:
(4) The chromatic reduces to the physical.
(5) The evaluative reduces to the physical.
(6) The chromatic and evaluative together reduce to the physical.
Again, we would expect that argument to be valid purely in virtue of the logic of
reduction.
1 Some philosophers treat a universal reductionist thesis such as physicalism as a background
assumption, not as a hypothesis to be argued for. This may well be a sensible policy in some philosophical
contexts. In this paper, however, my concern is with the structure of arguments for a universal
reductionist conclusion.
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Since sweeping arguments for universal reductionism are rarely available,
arguments for it tend to proceed in a piecemeal manner. Without the availability of
vertical chaining and horizontal accumulation, such a piecemeal approach is not
going to succeed. It is thus a constraint on an explication of reduction that it
guarantees the validity of arguments such as the above—that is allows chaining,
broadly construed. (I shall be more precise about what this chaining constraint
amounts to in Sect. 2.)
The significant role that chaining plays in arguments for reductionist theses can
be further exemplified with the case of physicalism. Confronted with high-level
phenomena, studied by special sciences such as sociology or economics, the
physicalist has little prospect of finding a direct way of establishing their
reducibility.2 In practice, they take an indirect route, perhaps through psychology
and neuroscience. The situation is no different when we consider philosophical
rather than scientific reductionist projects. David Lewis’ strategy when arguing for
Humean supervenience—a close relative of physicalism—is a case in point.
Humean supervenience claims that everything supervenes on the Humean mosaic,
understood as a spatiotemporal arrangement of local intrinsic qualities. When
sketching an argument for the Humean supervenience of counterfactuals, Lewis
implicitly appeals to the kind of chaining I mentioned:
To the extent that this similarity [which determines whether counterfactuals
are true] consists of perfect match in matters of particular fact, it supervenes
easily on the arrangement of qualities; and to the extent that it consists of . . .
conformity by one world to the laws of the other, it supervenes if the laws do.
(Lewis 1986, xii)
Lewis’ idea here is that counterfactuals can be shown to supervene on the
Humean mosaic by verifying that they supervene on the laws and the mosaic
together, and also establishing that the laws supervene on the mosaic. The argument
has the same form as the one from (1) and (2) to (3) displayed above.
A martial metaphor may help to make the rather abstract chaining constraint
more vivid.3 Suppose a fictitious country, Physicalia, is trying to devise a strategy to
conquer the whole world. Its leaders might draw up a list of territories, and decide
upon a sequence in which they are to be brought under control. A prudent plan for
them would be to first conquer the neighbouring countries, then build bases in them,
and only then invade their neighbouring countries that are not its own neighbours;
and so on. Otherwise the supply lines from Physicalia would be too long. The idea
of chaining is that every country thus conquered will count as controlled by
Physicalia alone, since any countries that helped had themselves been conquered by
it.
2 I shall take the physicalist to be a paradigmatic universal reductionist. The term ‘‘reduction’’ gets used
in many different ways, of course. In this paper, I use it in a rather broad sense, ignoring among other
things some of the finer distinctions at issue in the debate between ‘‘reductive’’ and ‘‘non-reductive’’
physicalism.
3 It is revealing that Lewis talks of the ‘‘plan of battle’’ (p. xi) he is executing in his ‘‘campaign’’ (p. ix)
on behalf of Humean supervenience.
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The point of the metaphor is that a reductionist physicalist will wish to use the
resources of neighbouring disciplines of physics when attempting to reduce the likes
of sociology and economics. To satisfy the chaining constraint, the relevant notion
of reduction must have the right structural features, such as being transitive—a
theme that will be explored in more detail in the next section.
Of course, the most carefully chosen sequence of conquests will not enable
Physicalia to achieve its goal of world domination unless the list of territories drawn
up is complete, in the sense of adding up to the whole world. This exhaustion
constraint may appear obvious as introduced here. But it has real bite when we
leave the war metaphor behind, and ask the question what a physicalist needs to
provide a reduction for. One natural answer is that she needs to provide a reduction
for all truths. Plausibly, there are infinitely many truths, and verifying their
reducibility one by one is not an option. The reductionist can only explicitly
consider a finite number of truths. Her strategy satisfies the exhaustion constraint if
she can successfully argue that if the cases she considers are reducible, then all cases
are reducible.
In this paper, I shall argue that otherwise promising approaches to reduction fail
to satisfy these constraints. In a nutshell, and with gross simplification, the point is
this: if the relata of reduction are classes of predicates or properties, then the
exhaustion constraint is violated; if they are classes of truths—be they sentences,
propositions, or facts—then the chaining constraint is violated. (Note the ambiguity
between properties and facts in ‘‘the realm of colours’’, ‘‘the physical’’ and ‘‘the
phenomenal’’ above.)
My stalking-horse in this paper is the universal reductionist project recently
articulated in Chalmers (2012). I choose it because of its virtues: it sets out the logic
of reductionist reasoning more explicitly, and in more detail, than other
representatives of the genre, for example Jackson (1998) or Lewis (1986).4 My
aim is not to refute the theses that Chalmers is putting forward, but rather to identify
a limitation in the argumentative strategy he uses in supporting them.5 The lessons
to be drawn are not restricted to Chalmers’ particular proposal, however, and extend
to universal reductionist projects more generally: such projects need to be designed
in such a way that both the chaining constraint and the exhaustion constraint are
satisfied.
In the next section, I introduce Chalmers’ project, and the key notion of
scrutability. In Sects. 3–6, I argue that the project is caught between the Scylla and
Charybdis of the exhaustion and chaining constraints. The final Sect. 7 discusses
what lessons the case study holds for universal reductionist projects more generally.
4 In both Lewis’ and Jackson’s case, the notion of supervenience in play is insufficiently specified; see
Stalnaker (1996) and Williamson (2001) for discussion.
5 Whether this is a problem for the project of Chalmers (2012) depends on whether that project is to
positively establish (with the sort of cogency that philosophical theses aspire to) the key thesis of the
book, or whether it is merely to argue that certain putative counterexamples can be resisted. I shall not
discuss that interpretive question in this paper.
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2 Definability versus scrutability
Chalmers presents his account as an updated and improved version of Carnap
(1928a), which many have considered a heroic failure at best, and a quixotic folly at
worst. While Carnap’s and Chalmers’ projects differ in a number of respects, one is
of particular relevance for the present paper: Carnap argues that all terms are
defined in terms of base terms, while Chalmers argues that all truths are implied by
base truths.6 Implication differs from definition in two salient ways: its relata are
sentences rather than words, and it requires only a sufficient condition, rather than
one that is both necessary and sufficient.
The shift from definition to implication is motivated by reflection on Gettier
cases and other counterexamples to proposed definitions. We can recognise that
knowledge cannot be defined as justified true belief, the thought goes, because
Gettier’s description of his case implies that Smith does not know that Jones owns a
Ford or is in Barcelona. As Chalmers (2012, p. 13) puts it, ‘‘it is striking that in
many cases, specifying a situation in terms of expressions that do not include
‘knowledge’ or its cognates (synonyms or near-synonyms) enables us to determine
whether or not the case involves knowledge.’’ He thinks that this is typical: terms do
not have definitions in base vocabulary, but a full enough specification of a situation
in base terms tells us whether they apply.
The central claim of Chalmers (2012) is that all truths about the world are a priori
implied by truths statable in some highly restricted vocabulary. While this view is
not neatly classified as either ontological, conceptual or epistemological reduction-
ism, it has important connections to all these views, which the book maps out in
detail.
Commenting on the broader philosophical orientation of their respective projects,
Chalmers (2012, xviii) summarises the contrast with Carnap as follows: ‘‘To
oversimplify, one might say that where Carnap leans toward empiricism, I lean
toward rationalism.’’ While he does not elaborate on the contrast, I take empiricism
and rationalism to respond differently to the worry that truths in areas such as
metaphysics and mathematics are unknowable. Empiricists give a deflationist
interpretation of the sentences whose truth is in question—e.g. ‘‘God exists,’’
‘‘people have immortal souls,’’ ‘‘our will is free,’’ ‘‘there are inaccessible
cardinals’’—or they deny the intelligibility of these sentences altogether. Ration-
alists, in contrast, take the sentences at face value, and argue that we do, in
principle, have the capacity to come to know whether they are true.
As I see it, the difference in outlook between empiricism and rationalism is
reflected in the difference between definability claims and a priori implication
claims. ‘‘Definition’’ often connotes ‘‘verbal’’, ‘‘conventional’’, or ‘‘non-substan-
tive.’’ The claim that terms belonging to a certain discourse are definable is naturally
accompanied by a deflationist conception of the subject matter of that discourse—a
conception I have associated with empiricism. Correspondingly, the claim that
6 I am glossing over subtleties of Carnap exegesis here. What is defined in Carnap (1928a) are officially
objects or concepts, not terms.
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truths belonging to a certain discourse are a priori implied fits a view that takes the
sentences expressing these truths at face value—a conception I have associated with
rationalism.
In this section and the two subsequent ones, shall argue that the shift from terms
to truths raises a structural problem. In Sect. 6, I shall return to the contrast between
rationalism and empiricism.
To be able to state Chalmers’ central thesis more precisely, we need to define the
key notion of scrutability:
Definition 1 A sentence / is scrutable from a class of sentences C iff for some
subset C0 of C, the material conditional
V
C0 ! / is a priori. A class D is
scrutable from C just in case every member is.
Here,
V
C0 is the (possibly infinite) conjunction of all the members of C0.7
Given a scenario w—which we may think of as a centred possible world—we are
often interested in classes C of sentences that are true in w, and such that every truth
of w is scrutable from C. I shall call such a class a base for w.
Chalmers aims to identify candidate bases that are parsimonious, and to argue
that they are indeed bases. The relevant kind of parsimony concerns the number of
expressions from which the sentences in the base are composed. According to him, a
base is compact if ‘‘it includes expressions from only a small number of families’’
(p. 21).8 The term ‘‘small’’ in the characterisation of compactness is vague, and we
may not be sure about how to individuate and count families. However, these issues
will not matter for our discussion.
Chalmers goes on to consider various candidate bases, most extensively one
called PQTI that is (in a slightly different form) already introduced in Chalmers and
Jackson (2001). In this article, I shall not be concerned with any base in particular.
Accordingly, I shall not try to present counterexamples to Chalmers’ scrutability
theses. Rather, I wish to highlight certain abstract and structural features of the
proposal, and draw lessons for how reductionist projects ought to be pursued.
Scrutability as defined is a relation between a sentence and a class of sentences,
and also between classes of sentences. In Sect. 1, I noted that any relation that is to
play the role of reduction needs to satisfy the chaining constraint. It is now time to
be more precise about what kind of chaining ought to be licensed.
In Sect. 1, I illustrated the chaining constraint with the argument from (1) and (2)
to (3), concerning the reduction of the realm of colours. The structural feature of
reduction exploited in that argument can be schematically formulated as follows:
½Quasi-transitivity x ) y
x [ y ) z
x ) z
7 This notion of scrutability is called ‘‘a priori scrutability’’ by Chalmers; since other notions of
scrutability he defines will not play a role in this article, I shall use the shorter term.
8 In fact, Chalmers adds another condition for a base to be compact, that it ‘‘includes no trivializing
mechanisms.’’ This complication is not relevant to this paper, and I shall ignore it.
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In words: for all x, y, and z, if y reduces to x, and z reduces to x and y together,
then z reduces to x. The symbol ) is a place-holder for a predicate expressing a
reductive relation (scrutability, for example), with the reducing items written on the
left, and the items to be reduced on the right. Moreover, x [ y denotes the class-
theoretic union of x and y, which stands for ‘‘x and y together’’. To obtain the
argument from (2) and (1) to (3) as an instance, we can interpret z as ‘‘the
chromatic’’, y as ‘‘the phenomenal’’, and x as ‘‘the physical.’’
Quasi-transitivity licenses a move that Chalmers calls ‘‘minimizing the base’’,
and that pervades his chapter 7: if it has been established that x [ y is a base—take
z to be the universal class—and that x is scrutable from y, we can conclude that y is a
base.
This structural feature of the relation ) is sometimes simply called ‘‘transitiv-
ity’’; I opt for the label ‘‘quasi-transitivity’’ since I wish to reserve the more familiar
term for the following feature:
[Transitivity] x ) y
y ) z
x ) z
Just like the chaining constraint requires a candidate relation of reduction to be
quasi-transitive, it requires it to be transitive.
In general, a quasi-transitive relation need not be transitive, nor vice versa.
However, transitivity follows from quasi-transitivity among relations that are
monotonic, in the sense that x ) y entails x0 ) y for every x0 of which x is a
subclass.9 Conversely, quasi-transitivity is entailed by transitivity together with a
further feature, which I shall call ‘‘self-adjunction’’10:
[Self-Adjunction]
x ) y
x ) x [ y
I shall not attempt to state conditions for satisfying the chaining constraint that
are individually necessary and jointly sufficient. I do claim, however, that being
transitive and quasi-transitive are necessary, since these features license forms of
reasoning that are practically indispensable in the context of universal reductionist
arguments. Among relations that are reflexive and monotonic, I take transitivity and
quasi-transivity also as jointly sufficient conditions, since they jointly entail certain
further features that license natural forms of reasoning.11 In particular, they entail
accumulation, the feature that guarantees the validity of the argument from (4) and
(5) to (6) in Sect. 112:
9 Suppose x ) y and y ) z. By monotonicity, x [ y ) z, and by quasi-transitivity, x ) z.
10 Suppose x ) y and x[y ) z. Since ) is self-adjunctive, x [ y ) y, and by transitivity, x ) z.
11 What about relations that are transitive and quasi-transitive, but either not reflexive or not monotonic?
For the purposes of this paper, it does not matter which ones among them shall count as satisfying the
chaining constraint.
12 To derive this, suppose x ) y and x ) z. By monotonicity, x[z ) y; by reflexivity, y[z ) y[z, and
by monotonicity again, y[ðx[zÞ ) y[z. Quasi-transitivity applied to this and to x [z ) y yields
x[z ) y[z; and applied again with x ) z, we get x ) y[z.
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[Accumulation] x ) y
x ) z
x ) y[z
So much for what the chaining constraint requires of a given relation which is to
play the role of reduction. As it turns out, the relation of scrutability passes that test.
It is reflexive—for any member / of any C, /! / is a priori—and monotonic—ifV
C0 ! / is a priori and C0  C, then VC! / is a priori. Moreover, it can be
shown to be self-adjunctive and transitive, which guarantees its quasi-transitivity.13
3 Sentential reduction and the exhaustion constraint
A ‘‘brute force’’ method of establishing a universal reductionist conclusion would
consist in going through all terms or sentences, and reduce them to the base, one by
one. As I emphasised in Sect. 1, and as should anyway be obvious, the brute force
method is not promising. In practice, the realm of what is to be reduced is divided
up in different sub-realms.
Traditionally, the sub-realms are different disciplines, like chemistry, biology,
psychology, and sociology, or different levels, perhaps corresponding to such
disciplines (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958). Chalmers’ sub-realms are the truths
expressible in certain families of expressions. In chapter 6 of his book, entitled
‘‘Hard Cases’’, there are sections called ‘‘Deferential terms’’, ‘‘Names’’, and
‘‘Indexicals and Demonstratives’’. Many other sections have the form ‘X-truths’,
where ‘X’ indicates the subject matter: mathematical, normative and evaluative,
ontological, modal, intentional, social, and metalinguistic. These subject-matters
correspond closely to families of expressions.
If truths involving only vocabulary in family A have been shown to be
scrutable from truths involving B-vocabulary, and the latter from C-truths, then we
can conclude that A-truths are scrutable from C-truths. No further consideration of
the relation between C-truths and A-truths is needed, since the result follows from
the transitivity of scrutability. More generally, there is no problem with chaining on
this strategy.
However, chaining only gives us so much. Suppose we have shown that A-truths
and B-truths are both scrutable from C-truths. Then by accumulation, it follows that
the class consisting of both the A-truths and the B-truths is scrutable. But neither
accumulation nor any of the other chaining principles considered will give us the
result that a truth mixing vocabulary from A and B will also be scrutable. Any binary
13 To verify that scrutability is self-adjunctive, suppose that C is scrutable from D, and suppose
/ 2 C[D. If / 2 C, then it is scrutable by assumption. If / 2 D, then it is scrutable from D since /! /
is a priori.
To establish transitivity, suppose that C is scrutable from D, and D from K. Pick any / 2 C. Then there
is a class D0  D, D0 ¼ fwi : i 2 Ig, such that
V
D0 ! / is a priori. For every i 2 I, there is K0  K such
that
V
K0 ! wi is a priori. Fix such a class Ki for every i. Then since what is a priori is closed under
conjunction and under tautological consequence,
VS
i2I Ki ! / is a priori. Hence C is scrutable from K.
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sentential operator can be used to generate such cross-family sentences, and many of
them will be true. This reveals a problem with the strategy of partitioning the
vocabulary into different families, and then establishing, for each family, that the
sentences formed using it are scrutable. Due to the existence of cross-family
sentences, that strategy is not suitable to show that all truths are scrutable from a
candidate base—it fails the exhaustion constraint.
Given that conjunction is the paradigmatic means of forming cross-family
sentences, it may appear that no serious problem results. Suppose that sentences /
and w are formulated in different vocabularies, and that they are both scrutable from
C. Consider now the conjunction / ^ w as an example of a cross-family sentence.
Since there are subsets C0 and C00 of C such that
V
C0 ! / and VC00 ! w are a
priori,
V
C0 ^VC00 ! / ^ w is also a priori. So conjunctions of scrutable sentences
are themselves scrutable. The same argument, mutatis mutandis, applies to
disjunctions of scrutable sentences, and to true material conditionals involving
them.
However, that kind of argument crucially relies on these connectives linking
sentences in a truth-functional way. As I will show in the next section, it does not
generalise to sentential connectives that are not truth-functional, nor to certain other
logical operators, such as quantifiers. Therefore, the argument does not provide an
easy fix for the problem. So even granted that each section of chapter 6 of Chalmers
(2012) demonstrates the scrutability of truths involving the relevant families of
expressions, and granted that those families jointly exhaust the vocabulary of our
language, the scrutability of all truths has not been established: cross-family
sentences may have escaped the net.
Still, we might think that the exhaustion constraint can be satisfied if we are more
careful with our book-keeping. The problem arises, the thought goes, because the
relevant relation holds between classes of sentences. The realm of sentences is
infinite, and there does not seem to be any useful way of partitioning it according to
the subject matter of the sentences, or the families of expressions occurring in them.
But perhaps we can reformulate the reductive project in such a way that it is the
class of all atomic expressions, or atomic concepts, that needs to stand in a
suitable relation to a base. In contrast to the realm of sentences, that of atomic
expressions is arguably finite, and there appear to be natural ways of partitioning
it—something philosophers have tried their hand at ever since Aristotle wrote the
Categories. Indeed, chapter 6 of Chalmers (2012) provides a good example of such
a partition. We should not expect to fall afoul of the exhaustion constraint if our
relata of reduction are classes of atomic expressions.
As it turns out, there is a relation among classes of expressions that is closely
related to scrutability. The relation is structurally similar to the more familiar one of
global supervenience, and it may be heuristically useful to think of it in these terms.
But since there are competing formal explications of global supervenience that
differ from each other in ways that are relevant here, and since the term
‘supervenience’ has connotations I wish to avoid in this context, I prefer to
introduce a new term of art for this relation: ‘scriability’, derived from ‘scry’, which
is Chalmers’ ‘‘preferred verb form of ‘scrutable’’’ (p. 30).
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The definition of the relation requires some set-up. For a class of expressions C,
let LðCÞ be the language whose vocabulary consists of C plus logical expressions.14
I shall use t(C, w) to denote the class of sentences of LðCÞ that are true in w (t(C),
with no scenario specified, is the class of LðCÞ-sentences that are actually true,
perhaps relative to a designated individual and time).
Definition 2 A class of expressions A is scriable from a class of expressions B in
w iff t(A, w) is scrutable from t(B, w).
As this definition makes clear, everything that can be said using ‘scriable’ could
be said using ‘scrutable’, so in the ensuing discussion we will still be concerned
with scrutability. I am introducing ‘scriable’ only to have a convenient way of
highlighting certain problems relating to chaining.
It is also true that an important range of scrutability claims can be equivalently
formulated in terms of scriability. Suppose that a putative scrutability base C
consists of all the truths only involving a certain vocabulary B (C ¼ tðBÞ).15 Then
the claim that C is a scrutability base is equivalent to the claim that B is a scriability
base.
So we have transformed a claim about the reducibility of all sentences into an
equivalent one about the reducibility of all atomic expressions. While the existence
of cross-family sentences means that we cannot exhaust the realm of sentences,
there is no particular reason to think that we cannot exhaust the realm of atomic
expressions. However, cross-family sentences continue to cause trouble, this time
with chaining, as I shall now argue.
4 Term reduction and the chaining constraint
Suppose that we frame the reductive project in terms of scriability. The desired
conclusion is that a given class B is a scriability base (such that t(B) is a scrutability
base). Let us grant that the families of expressions that Chalmers considers in
chapter 6 jointly exhaust the total vocabulary; and that each family is scriable from
the putative base B. Assuming that mathematical and colour vocabulary are among
the families, this means that every sentence formed exclusively from mathematical
vocabulary is scrutable from t(B), and likewise every sentence formed exclusively
from colour vocabulary.
It is clear that if we wish to infer the desired conclusion from the premises just
granted, we shall need to rely on certain chaining principles. These would allow us,
for example, to infer that a truth that mixes mathematical and colour vocabulary—a
kind of cross-family sentence—is also scriable from B. Just like cross-family
sentences raised the exhaustion problem for the project as formulated in terms of
scrutability, they seem to prima facie raise the chaining problem for its variant using
scriability. The same underlying problem manifests itself in different ways for the
14 I shall specify the background logic when I introduce cases.
15 Chalmers’ main candidate base, PQTI, does not satisfy that condition. See footnote 30.
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two strategies. In this section, I shall argue in detail that scriability fails to satisfy the
chaining constraint.
Specifically, I shall show that scriability fails to be quasi-transitive, and that it
fails to accumulate. To do that, it suffices to establish that it is not self-adjunctive.16
For scriability is reflexive, and among reflexive relations, quasi-transitivity entails
self-adjunction, as does accumulation.17
One class of counterexamples to self-adjunction involves cross-family quantifi-
cations. I shall introduce the problem first in a schematic way, and subsequently
suggest a couple of instances.
Consider a scenario wab with exactly two things a and b, with a being F and b
being G; and waa, which is like w ab except that a is both F and G, and b is neither.
Thus the two scenarios both contain an F and a G, but they differ on whether the
F is the same as the G.
More formally, the following descriptions are true in these scenarios:
Fa ^ :Ga ^ :Fb ^ Gb ^ 8zðz ¼ a _ z ¼ bÞ ðScenario wabÞ
Fa ^ Ga ^ :Fb ^ :Gb ^ 8zðz ¼ a _ z ¼ bÞ ðScenario waaÞ
These descriptions are couched in a language LðfF;G; a; bgÞ, with F, G, a, and b
as the only non-logical terms, and with the logical resources of first-order predicate
logic with identity. We shall leave aside the question whether names are scriable,
and focus on how wab and waa can be described without them. This move is
dialectically permissible, since the present aim is only to show that self-adjunction
has false instances, so I am free to specify the languages in question. Moreover,
reductionists typically do not consider names, or sentences containing names, to be
in the reduction base.18
I shall argue that fF;Gg is not scriable from fFg in wab. For note that the
following sentence of LðfF;GgÞ is true in wab but not in waa:
(7) 9x9yðFx ^ :Gx ^ :Fy ^ Gy ^ 8zðz ¼ x _ z ¼ yÞÞ
However, there is no sentence of LðfFgÞ that distinguishes the scenarios. All we
can say about them with such limited vocabulary is that there are two things, exactly
16 These points about the structural features of scriability are in some sense analogous to ones that have
been made in the context of assessing different explications of the notion of global supervenience. When
A and B are classes of predicates, A is scriable from B in all scenarios just in case the class of relations
expressed by the members of A weakly globally supervenes on the class of relations expressed by the
members of B. In a paper defending the usefulness of the concept of weak global supervenience, Sider
(1999, p. 917, fn.11) notes that weak global supervenience is not self-adjunctive and also fails a further
condition closely related to quasi-transitivity. In Leuenberger (2009, pp. 119–120), I argue that since
weak global supervenience does not have the right formal features, it is not a good explication of the
intuitive notion of global supervenience.
17 Suppose x ) y. Since ) is reflexive, x[y ) x[y. By quasi-transitivity (setting z ¼ x[y), x ) x[y.
To show that accumulation and reflexivity entail self-adjunction, suppose x ) y. By reflexivity,
x ) x, and by accumulation, x ) x[y.
18 This is true of Chalmers, Jackson, and Lewis, for example.
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one of which is F. Hence tðfFg;wabÞ ¼ tðfFg;waaÞ.19 This allows us to infer the
desired conclusion that fF;Gg is not scriable from fFg in wab. For reductio,
suppose otherwise. Then for some C  tðfFg;wabÞ, the material conditional withV
C as antecedent and (7) as consequent is a priori. But since
tðfFg;wabÞ ¼ tðfFg;waaÞ,
V
C is true in waa. We then get the false result that (7)
is true in waa.
Since fF;Gg is not scriable from fFg in wab, we will have a failure of self-
adjunction if fGg is scriable from fFg in wab. But that may very well be the case—
for some instances, there will be an a priori connection between how things stand F-
wise with how things stand G-wise. More formally, what is needed is that the
following sentence is a priori:
(8) 9x9yðFx ^ :Fy ^ 8zðz ¼ x _ z ¼ yÞÞ ! 9x9yðGx ^ :GyÞ
All we can say about wab in language LðfGgÞ is that there are two things, exactly
one of which is G. Assuming that (8) is a priori, this will be a priori implied by its
antecedent 9x9yðFx ^ :Fy ^ 8zðz ¼ x _ z ¼ yÞÞ, which belongs to tðfFg;wÞ. It
then follows that tðfGg;wÞ is scrutable from tðfFg;wÞ, i.e. that fGg is scriable from
fFg in wab. This shows that scriability is not self-adjunctive.
This concludes the schematic argument that cross-family quantifications may
lead to a violation of the chaining constraint. I shall now consider instances of the
schematic letters F and G.
Suppose that the predicates are interpreted as follows:
• F is true of x in w iff x has proton mass in w, and w includes at least one object
that has unit negative charge, and one that does not have unit negative charge.
• G is true of x in w iff x has unit negative charge in w.
For these instances, (8) is indeed a priori: the antecedent implies that there is
something that has unit negative charge, and something that does not—which is
what the consequent says.
We obtain scenarios verifying the relevant sentences by supposing that a is a
proton and b an electron in wab, and that a is an anti-proton—which has the mass of
a proton and the (negative) charge of an electron—and b a positron—which has the
mass of an electron and the (positive) charge of a proton—in waa.
Once we see the pattern, we can easily generate further instances. Suppose that as
in Fig. 1, a is a black square in wab, and a black circle in waa; while b is a grey circle
in wab, and a grey square in waa.
There are no things apart from a and b. Interpret the predicates thus:
• F is true of x in w iff x is black in w, and w includes at least one circle and one
non-circle.
• G is true of x in w iff x is a circle in w.
19 A rigorous argument for this claim would proceed by induction on the complexity of formulas of
LðfFgÞ.
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Again, it will then follow that fGg is scriable from fFg in wab, but fF;Gg is
not.20
The significance of the counterexample might be disputed on the grounds that the
interpretation of the predicate F is contrived, picking out a highly extrinsic
conjunctive property. This feature is inessential, however. We could work with less
contrived predicates, and compensate by increasing the syntactic complexity of the
a priori conditionals. In the case of the first interpretation, we could add a binary
predicate which applies to x and y in w iff they are oppositely charged in w, for
example.
Quantification is not the only means to form cross-family sentences that leads to
failures of self-adjunction. I shall consider one further example, a cross-family
counterfactual, linking sentences p and q that are atomic expressions.
Consider two scenarios in which p and q are both false, but which differ on the
counterfactual ‘‘if p had been the case, then q would have been the case’’. Formally:
:p ^ :q ^ ph! q ðScenario vÞ
:p ^ :q ^ :ðph! qÞ ðScenario v0Þ
These sentences belong to the language Lðfp; q; h!gÞ, with p and q as the only
atomic sentences, and containing the connectives of propositional logic in addition
to h!. The scenarios cannot be distinguished in that language. For the atomic
sentence p is false in both, and counterfactuals such as ph! p or :ph! p have
the same truth-value in both scenarios. With an argument analogous to the one given
in the case of cross-family quantification, we can conclude that fp; q; h!g is not
scriable from fp; h!g in v (nor in v0).
Consider now the following:
(9) :p ! :q
world wab
a
b
world waa
a
b
Fig. 1 Scenarios
indistinguishable in colour-
language and in shape-language,
but distinguishable in colour-
and-shape language
20 This is structurally the same as the ‘‘many-property problem’’ that Jackson (1977, 64ff) influentially
raises against adverbialism. If the arguments of the present paper are correct, that problem afflicts
Jackson’s own later account of reductive explanation, developed in joint work with Chalmers (Chalmers
and Jackson 2001).
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If this material conditional is a priori, then fqg is scriable from fpg in v, and a
fortiori from fp; h!g. For :q a priori implies every member of tðfqg; vÞ. Hence
fqg is scriable from fp; h!g in v. Since fp; q; h!g is not, as we have seen above,
self-adjunction fails.
It is not hard to find instances where :p ! :q is a priori. Let p mean ‘‘there is
precipitation’’, and q ‘‘it is snowing’’. Surely it is a priori that if there is no
precipitation, it is not snowing. A dry and cold place can serve as our scenario v, and
a dry and warm place as our v0.
The examples presented in this section show that scriability fails to satisfy the
chaining constraint.21
It might be suggested that scriability does not chain in the right way since it is
defined in terms of a priori implication, rather than a more robust relation such as
ground (Bliss and Trogdon 2016). I shall briefly consider the proposal that we work
with ground as our reductive relation.
Let ground-scrutability be defined as in Definition 1, except that ‘‘C0 grounds /’’
replaces ‘‘the material conditional
V
C0 ! / is a priori’’; and likewise for ground-
scriability and Definition 2. Then my counterexamples to self-adjunction arguably
do not go through: 9xFx surely does not ground 9xGx, where G is ‘‘has negative
charge’’, and F is true of x iff has mass and inhabits a world with at least one object
that has unit negative charge, and one that does not have unit negative charge.
Still, this modification does not go to the heart of the problem. We are facing the
same structural problem when we replace talk of scrutability with talk of ground.
Since claims about ground tend to be a great deal more controversial than claims
about scrutability, it is a bit harder to find clear violations of the chaining constraint.
But here is a fictitious example that might work.
Suppose that there is a relation of marriage*, which is like marriage, except that it
can only hold between a woman (the wife*) and a man (the husband*). In scenarios
w and v, Andrea and Blake are married* (Mab), and this truth grounds the truth that
there is a husband* and a wife* (9xHx ^ 9yWy). Specifically, fWg is ground-
scriable from fa; b;Mg in w. Now Andrea is a wife* in w and a husband* in v, and
Blake a husband* in w and a wife* in v—gender is a contingent characteristic. It is
then plausible that Mab does not ground Wa in w.22 Hence fW ; ag, and a fortiori
21 We could define a relation scriability* in such a way that self-adjunction is guaranteed: a class of
expressions A is scriable* from a class of expressions B in w iff tðA[B;wÞ is scrutable from t(B, w). It
turns out that that relation is also quasi-transitive. However, it is not transitive, and thus still fails to
satisfy the chaining constraint. Given the interpretation sketched, fq; h!g is scriable* from fqg, and fsg
from fpg; yet fq; h!g is not scriable* from fpg in either scenario. The bump in the carpet has only been
moved.
Just as scriability is closely related to the notion of weak global supervenience (see note 16),
scriability* is closely related to the notion of intermediate global supervenience, which Bennett (2004)
and Shagrir (2002) introduce as a natural explication of global supervenience. When A and B are classes
of predicates, A is scriable* from B in all scenarios just in case the class of relations expressed by the
members of A intermediately globally supervenes on the class of relations expressed by the members of
B. In Leuenberger (2009, 119), I show that intermediate global supervenience is neither monotonic, nor
transitive, nor accumulative.
22 This is a consequence of necessitarianism about grounding, but even those who think that grounds are
not always necessitating should accept the verdict in this particular case.
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fW ; a; b;Mg, is not ground-scriable from fa,b,Mg in w—a violation of self-
adjunction, given that fWg is ground-scriable from fa; b;Mg in w. The move to
ground has thus failed to solve the problem, and I will not consider it further in this
paper.
5 Analysing arguments that appeal to chaining
We have considered two relations that might be used to construct a reductionist
layer-cake. Scrutability, which takes classes of sentences as relata, does not let us
divide the realm to be reduced into finitely many blocks that are usefully treated
separately. Scriability takes classes of expressions as relata, but lacks the structural
features that would legitimise certain forms of inference that we consider natural in
such a context.
These relations have so far been examined in an abstract and general manner. In
this section, I am returning to the argument from (1) and (2) to (3), concerning the
reducibility of the realm of colours. I pointed out in section 1 that we would expect
arguments of that form to be valid, and that reductionist projects are in trouble if
they are not. With the sharpened tools in hand, I would like to have a closer look at
that argument.
We need to disambiguate the generic ‘‘reduces to.’’ I shall argue that there is a
problem whether we read it as ‘‘is scriable from’’ as well as if we read it as ‘‘is
scrutable from’’.
Suppose that we re-write the argument replacing ‘‘reduces to’’ with ‘‘is scriable
from’’:
ð10Þ The chromatic is scriable from the phenomenal and physical together.
ð20Þ The phenomenal is scriable from the physical.
ð30Þ The chromatic is scriable from the physical.
Accordingly, we take ‘‘the chromatic’’, ‘‘the physical’’ and ‘‘the phenomenal’’ to
be classes of expressions. The validity of this arguments turns on the quasi-
transitivity of scriability. As argued in the last section, however, scriability fails to
be quasi-transitive, so the argument is invalid.
Suppose now that we replace ‘‘reduces’’ with ‘‘is scrutable from’’:
ð100Þ The chromatic is scrutable from the phenomenal and physical together.
ð200Þ The phenomenal is scrutable from the physical.
ð300Þ The chromatic is scrutable from the physical.
Accordingly, we take the relata to be classes of sentences. However, we are not
yet done disambiguating, since it is not immediately clear what class of truths the
‘‘phenomenal and physical together’’ picks out. Premise (100) has two natural
readings: if B is the class of physical and B0 the class of phenomenal expressions,
‘‘the phenomenal and physical together’’ can mean either tðB[B0Þ or tðBÞ[tðB0Þ. On
the former reading, (100) is equivalent to (10), and the argument as a whole is just a
notational variant of the one from (10) and (20) to (30). As such, it will share its fate
of being invalid.
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On the reading of ‘‘the phenomenal and physical together’’ as tðBÞ[tðB0Þ, the
argument is valid—scrutability is quasi-transitive, as we have seen. However,
premise (100) is not the plausible claim that (1) was advertised to be.23 To know what
colours things have in a scenario, we need to know not just their physical type and
the distribution of phenomenal colour experiences, but also how the two match up. I
will illustrate this with two scenarios w and v that are physically alike and yet
phenomenally inverted with respect to each other.
In both w and v, there are exactly five things: two observers x and x0, two
observed things y and y0, and a fifth thing z that is neither observed nor observing.24
The observed y and the unobserved z are of the same physical type F; y0 is of the
incompatible physical type F0; and the observers x and x0 are of the same physical
type F00. Object x observes y but not y0 (Oxy ^ :Oxy0), and x0 observes y0 but not
y (Ox0y0 ^ :Ox0y). The physical facts in w and v are represented in Fig. 2, with
arrows drawn between observers and what they observe.
The two scenarios are indistinguishable in physical language: if fF;F0;F00;Og is
the class B of physical expressions, then tðB;wÞ ¼ tðB; vÞ.
Phenomenally, w and v are also indistinguishable: in both, there is one observer
that has a green experience, and one that has a red experience. Then if C is the class
of phenomenal expressions, we have tðC;wÞ ¼ tðC; vÞ.25
However, the observers in the two scenarios are phenomenally inverted relative
to each other. In both scenarios, y0 is the only F0 thing. In scenario w, x0, the observer
of y0, has a red experience, and x, observing an F-thing, has a green experience. In
scenario v, x0 has a green experience, and x a red experience. Suppose further that in
both scenarios, there are law-like, counterfactual-supporting connections between
observed physical types and phenomenal properties instantiated in the observer. It is
then plausible to say that there is at least one red thing and one green thing in both
scenarios: in w, y0 is red and y is green, while y is red and y0 green in v. But what is
the colour of the unobserved z? The natural answer, it seems to me, is that z has
whatever colour y has, since they are of the same physical type F.26 So z is green in
w and red in v. If that is correct, ‘‘there are two green things’’ is a chromatic truth of
w that is not scrutable from tðB;wÞ[tðB0;wÞ.27
23 A similar diagnosis, mutatis mutandis, applies to Chalmers’ claim that ‘All truths are a priori
scrutable from F-truths and indexical truths’ follows from ‘All super-rigid truths are a priori
scrutable from F-truths’ and ‘All truths are a priori scrutable from super-rigid truths and indexical
truths’, ‘‘given the transitivity of a priori scrutability’’ (Chalmers 2012, 406). (He uses the label
‘transitivity’ for a stronger condition than I have done in this paper.)
24 I here take observation to be a physical relation, but this is not essential to the example; we could also
take it to be a phenomenal relation, or both physical or phenomenal, or neither.
25 Neither B nor C includes names of the things in these scenarios. In Sect. 4, I have argued that
excluding them is legitimate.
26 There may well be philosophical accounts of colour which do not vindicate these judgments. My point
is merely that premise (100) is open to objections which would not seem to threaten (1) on the more natural
reading.
27 Such inversion scenarios which spell trouble for (100) are compatible with the truth of (200): for all that
has been said, tðC;wÞ may well be scrutable from t(B, w).
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6 Beyond toy languages?
I have argued that Chalmers’ strategy to verify a given class of sentences as a
scrutability base is problematic. This is not to say, of course, that the sort of
candidate classes he considers, consisting of physical, phenomenal, indexical and
totality truths, are not in fact bases. When illustrating the failure of the chaining
constraint, I worked with highly impoverished toy languages. This prompts the
question whether the considerations of this paper ‘‘scale up’’ to the question whether
all truths are scrutable from the truths in a plausible candidate base. It seems to me
that they do.
Sentences formulated in both the language of arithmetic and the language of
analysis are traditionally taken to be a priori knowable. But now consider the
following cross-family sentence, using vocabulary from both languages:
(10) Some natural number is a real number.
While (10) seems pre-theoretically plausible, it is incompatible with the set-
theoretic definitions of number systems that mathematics students are taught in their
first semester. There is no agreement among philosophers of mathematics about
whether (10) is true. This does not show establish that this sentence is unknowable.
Nonetheless, I think the contrast of their status with that of sentences of either
arithmetic or analysis is suggestive. It must be at least doubtful whether (10) is a
priori knowable, or scrutable from a plausible base.
My second potential counterexample involves counterfactual conditionals.28
Suppose we are given a certain description C of the world that includes all truths
stateable in physical, neurophysiological, phenomenal, and behavioural terms. It
says, among other things, that at a given time Ann’s C-fibres are firing (Ca), that
Ann is in pain (Pa), and that Ann’s hand jerks back from the stove (Ja). I now wish
to show that given certain further assumptions, the truth-values of counterfactuals
that involve any two of these sentences are scrutable from C, but that some that
involve all three are not.
type F type F type F
x
x
z
y
y
Fig. 2 Physical types of things
in w and v
28 My exposition will assume a standard semantics for counterfactuals in the style of Lewis and
Stalnaker, but I suspect that the problem does not depend on the correctness of that semantics.
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Suppose that C also includes sentences a priori equivalent to the following six
counterfactuals:
(11) :Pah! :Ca
(12) :Pah! :Ja
(13) :Cah! :Pa
(14) :Cah! :Ja
(15) :Jah! Ca
(16) :Jah! Pa
Sentences (11) and (12) tell us what would happen if Ann were not in pain: her
C-fibres would not be firing, and her hand would not jerk back from the stove.
Similarly, (13) and (14) tell us what would happen if Ann’s C-fibres were not firing:
she would not be in pain, and again, her hand would not jerk back from the stove.
We may take (11) and (13) to reflect a realisation relationship between the firing of
Ann’s C-fibres and Ann’s pain. In contrast, (12) and (14) are symptomatic of a
causal relationship between them and Ann’s hand jerking back from the stove.
Counterfactuals (15) and (16) are true since the hand movement occurs later than
the onset of pain and C-fibre firing, and since the counterfactuals are read in a non-
backtracking way.
Further, C includes twelve sentences a priori equivalent to negated counterfac-
tuals with a contradictory consequent, of the form :ðp ^ qh!?Þ, where Ca or
:Ca may take the place of p, Ja or :Ja the place of q, and Pa or :Pa either the
place of p or of q (but where G is not occurring both the p-slot or the q-slot). These
sentences express the non-vacuity of counterfactual suppositions involving any two
of Ca, Pa, and Ja. One such sentence is :ðCa ^ :Pah!?Þ. Given the semantics, it
entails that there are worlds where Ann’s C-fibres are firing without her being in
pain.
Any counterfactual that involves, along with logical vocabulary, only two from
among the neurophysiological truth Ca, the phenomenal truth Pa, and the
behavioural truth Ja, is thus scrutable from C. The same is not in general true, I
shall argue, for cross-family counterfactuals that involve all three of these sentences.
While one example of inscrutability from C would be enough in the present
dialectic, it is instructive to consider a pair of them, following Karen Bennett
(2008, 2003)29:
(17) Pa ^ :Cah! Ja
(18) Ca ^ :Pah! Ja
Both these counterfactuals have antecedents that are only true in worlds where
the link between C-fibre firing and pain is broken: we have either pain without C-
fibre firing, or C-fibre firing without pain. What is their truth-value in a world in
which all members of C are true?
29 Bennett discussed these counterfactuals in the context of the causal exclusion problem.
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I shall introduce four metaphysical hypotheses about the world that are all a
priori compatible with C, and yet predict different truth-values for (17) and (18).
Three of these views are versions of dualism according to which C-fibre firing is
nomically connected to pain in a way that supports counterfactuals such as (11) and
(13) (Chalmers 1996).
Consider overdeterminist dualism first. If that view is true, [Ann’s C-fibres are
firing] and [Ann is in pain] are genuine causes of [Ann’s hand jerks back from the
stove], and each one would be causally sufficient on its own. (I write [p] for ‘the fact
that p’.) Hence both (17) and (18) are true. Indeed, Bennett suggests that the truth of
these two counterfactuals is diagnostic of overdetermination.
Next, interactionist dualism. In a world where that view is true, [Ann is in pain]
is the genuine cause of [Ann’s hand jerks back from the stove], while Ca is only
causally relevant to the latter, via its metaphysically contingent nomic relationship
to [Ann is in pain]. So once we move to the closest worlds where that latter
relationship does not hold, Ja co-varies with Pa, not with Ca. Hence (17) is true and
(18) false.
Third, suppose that epiphenomenalist dualism holds. Then [Ann’s C-fibres are
firing] is the genuine cause of [Ann’s hand jerks back from the stove], and
accordingly, (17) is false and (18) true.
The fourth view is a kind of physicalism that takes the connection between
C-fibre firing and pain to be contingent in two respects. First, it allows that firing
C-fibres do not realise pain if they fail to be appropriately integrated into a nervous
system—if their environment is a petri dish, for example (Shoemaker 1981).
Second, it allows that there are merely possible worlds where physicalism is false,
including worlds where Ann is in pain without having C-fibres that are firing—she
might be a disembodied ghost. Such a view is compatible with C. Specifically, it is
compatible with (12), since it allows that a realised property like pain can be a
counterfactual difference-maker (List and Menzies 2009). We can argue that both
our cross-family counterfactuals are false, on such a view. Of the two, (18) is easier
to evaluate: in some of the the closest worlds where Ca ^ :Pa is true, physicalism
still holds, but the C-fibres are wired up very differently from how they actually are
in Ann’s body. In this different environment, they fail to cause Ja, such that (18) is
false. The truth-value of (17) depends on what the closest worlds where Pa ^ :Ca is
true are like. We can suppose, consistently with C and physicalism, that C-fibres are
the only possible physical realisation of pain. If so, physicalism is false in any world
where Pa ^ :Ca is true. Arguably, some of the closest such worlds are ones where
Ann has an epiphenomenal pain, such that (17) is false.
If I am right about these four views, then the counterfactuals (17) and (18) that
involve Ca, Pa, and Ja are not scrutable from C, even though C settles the truth-
values of counterfactuals that involve any two of them. We might have thought that
if the truth-values of certain simple counterfactuals are settled, those of more
complex ones are thereby also determined.30 But this is not so, as we have seen. If
30 When Chalmers describes the candidate base he calls PQTI, he includes a limited range of
counterfactual conditionals in it: ‘‘We can allow P to include . . . statements of lawful regularities and
counterfactual dependence among microphysical and macrophysical truths. . . . We can allow Q to include
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the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional negates a nomic connection between
sentences in different families, it will be true only at far-away worlds. So the truth-
value of the conditional will depend on remoteness comparisons among those
worlds which are irrelevant to evaluate counterfactuals with antecedents from one
family only. Those comparisons may in turn depend on metaphysical questions
about the actual world.
Any such example raises important points that could be discussed further. But I
recommend that we move beyond a mere case-by-case evaluation of potential
counterexamples to a scrutability thesis. We need to ask not only whether we have
encountered a counterexample, but also how evidentially significant our inability
to find a counterexample is. As Eddington famously pointed out, some generali-
sations seem to be confirmed not because they are true, but because falsifying
instances evade our means of detection:
Let us suppose that an ichthyologist is exploring the life of the ocean. He casts
a net into the water and brings up a fishy assortment. Surveying his catch, he
proceeds in the usual manner of a scientist to systematise what it reveals. He
arrives at two generalisations: (1) No sea-creature is less than two inches long.
(2) All sea-creatures have gills. These are both true of his catch, and he
assumes tentatively that they will remain true however often he repeats it.
(Eddington 1938, 16)
The point is, of course, that the holes of the net are too big to catch smaller fish.
We need to ask whether there is any reason to think that on the assumption that there
are cross-family sentences falsifying a certain scrutability thesis, we have not been
able to recognise them as such. It seems to me that there are two such reasons. First,
we are prone to ignore cross-family sentences, or only consider special cases of
them. Second, such sentences tend to be complex, and they are often particularly
hard to reach stable intuitive verdicts about. Moreover, what verdicts we favour may
well turn on where we stand with respect to certain contentious metaphysical
questions.
In response to this point, Chalmers might claim that the relevant cross-family
sentences are indeterminate in truth-value. At any rate, there is a passage that
suggests that this would be his line about (10):
An exception [to the thesis that inscrutability of reference does not lead to
indeterminacy in truth-value] may be quasi-philosophical statements such as
‘the number two is a set of sets’, and the like. But now the issue is restricted to
a few isolated sentences in the metaphysical domain. (Chalmers 2012, 37)
Perhaps it is indeed indeterminate whether some natural number is a real number.
However, pleading indeterminacy may be less attractive in connection with (17) and
(18), let alone in general. On the face of it, metaphysics, and philosophy more
Footnote 30 continued
any . . . truths concerning lawful regularities and counterfactual dependence between the phenomenal
truths . . . and microphysical or macrophysical truths’’ (Chalmers 2012, pp. 110–111). Crucially, PQTI
does not include counterfactuals with cross-family antecedents such as (17) and (18).
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generally, is shot through with cross-family sentences. Both ‘‘some minds are brain’’
and its negation mix physical and mental vocabulary; both ‘‘all sentient organisms
have rights’’ and its negation mix biological and normative vocabulary. The relevant
class is extensive, and hardly consists only of a few isolated sentences.
Chalmers has not given us reasons to think that such sentences are scrutable from
the bases he considers. If they are indeterminate in truth-value, then a class of
sentences may be a base even though neither they nor their negations are
scrutable from it. If so, the scrutability thesis would not be threatened.31 But
stipulating widespread indeterminacy significantly detract from the interest of his
thesis. As Chalmers emphasises, scrutability limits in principle ignorance. But it is
no news that knowability claims can be defended by denying that apparently
meaningful philosophical claims have a truth-value. Carnap (1928b) and Ayer
(2001) have taught us that much. Chalmers would hardly be more rationalist than
Carnap.
It is a natural thought that Chalmers could avoid joining Carnap in the anti-
rationalist ranks by instead taking a leaf from him with respect to another issue that
separates them—the role of definitions. Carnap’s idea was that all terms are to be
defined using only terms in the base. That strategy does not face either of the
problems I mentioned. The number of terms, as opposed to the number of sentences,
is finite, so the realm to be reduced can be usefully sub-divided. But unlike
scriability, the relation that holds between classes of terms if every member of the
former is definable in terms of the latter does satisfy the chaining constraint.
Given plausible assumptions, the claim that every term is definable using terms in
B entails the claim that B is a scriability base.32 So we should certainly not give
more credence to the claim that there is a compact definability base than to the claim
that there is a compact scrutability base. But it is a well-known phenomenon that
sometimes, the only practically feasible way to establish a thesis is to first establish
a logically stronger thesis, and then deduce the former as a corollary. This might be
the situation with Chalmers’ scrutability theses.
So far, my discussion suggests a return to a Carnapian definitional project. Still, I
wish to conclude with two reasons to be cautious.
First, definitions raise their own technical questions. They are typically conceived
as quantified biconditionals, perhaps with a certain modal force. Moreover, they are
standardly taken to license substitution in every context. It is this feature which
ensures that the definitional account satisfies the chaining constraint. However, the
relevant quantified biconditionals may not be available even in infinitary languages,
unless there is an upper bound on the size of scenarios.33 Even if they are available,
they may not license substitution in every context unless a certain global assumption
31 At least there would not be a direct threat. There may still be an indirect one. Unlike in the case of
vagueness, there would be little reason to think that there was higher-order indeterminacy. If there is not,
claims of the form ‘‘indet p’’ will be determinately true (Chalmers 2012, pp. 33–34). But it is not clear
whether those indeterminacy claims are a priori knowable.
32 I will not spell out the notion of definition formally here, or discuss these assumptions.
33 Pertinent issues are discussed in Leuenberger (2018).
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about the language holds. In Carnap’s case, that assumption was extensionality. But
these assumptions are themselves very problematic, and it is not clear how they can
be justified.34
Second, definitions raise broader philosophical questions. In the introductory
section, I suggested that rationalism differs from empiricism by interpreting truths
of metaphysics and mathematics in a non-deflationary way. I also noted that such
definitional reduction suggests a deflationary reading of the relevant sentences. It
thus remains to be seen whether a successful universal reductionist project can
remain in the spirit of rationalism.
7 Conclusion
The problem of cross-family sentences that I have raised prompts us to pay close
attention to the question of what the relata of reduction are. Are they such things as
expressions, concepts or properties, or rather things like sentences, propositions or
facts? The latter form an infinite and in some sense open-ended domain, making it
difficult to argue for a conclusion about everything that belongs to it. On this horn of
the dilemma, what I have called ‘‘the exhaustion constraint’’ fails to be satisfied.
The domain of expressions, in contrast, is arguably finite, and we can hope to
exhaust it by tackling its members one by one. However, the problem of cross-
family sentences shows that exhausting the domain of expressions is not in general
enough to exhaust the domain of sentences made up from those expressions. It
suffices only if certain chaining and accumulation principles hold for the relation of
reduction. But the relevant relation between classes of expressions may well fail to
satisfy the chaining constraint, leading to the second horn of my dilemma for
someone arguing for universal reductionism.
While our candidate bases may change over time, universal reductionism itself
will not lose its allure. Philosophers of a certain intellectual temperament will keep
trying to vindicate versions of the view. My aim here has been to articulate design
constraints for their arguments.
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